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Introduction 
On August 3rd 1981, shortly after Ronald Reagan became the 40th president of the United States, 
13,000 air traffic controllers began a strike that would fundamentally change the lives of 11,345 
of these strikers. It also proved a fundamental moment in Reagan’s tenure as president. The 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization had begun intense negotiations with the federal 
government for better wages, fewer hours, and a better retirement plan. Despite a law prohibiting 
federal government employees from striking, PATCO called on its members to strike. Instead of 
budging in, Reagan relied on his contingency plan, which involved amongst others military 
controllers to fill in 75 percent of the striking gap. On August 4th, Reagan gave the strikers an 
ultimatum: show up for work within 48 hours or be fired. Consequently, 11,345 persons that did 
not show up to work were fired the next day.1 This drastic matter, taken by a newly inaugurated 
president, calls for many questions, one of which is: what do these events say about Reagan as 
president and as person?  
Ronald Reagan is known for many things. This former actor is often called ‘the great 
communicator.’2 Many know Reagan for his humor and wit. One very famous example is that 
Reagan apologized to his wife after he got shot with the words: ‘‘Honey, I forgot to duck.’’3 He 
is also attributed credit for his role in ending the Cold War. Winston Groom for instance states: 
‘‘now the Cold War is history, and Americans can thank Ronald Reagan in large part for that.’’4 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher even said that Ronald Reagan “won the Cold War 
without firing a shot.”5 According to a 2011 Gallup Poll Ronald Reagan is considered the 
greatest U.S. President of all time.6 Many people have their own views about Reagan and 
remember him in a specific way. Many Republicans see him as a far right conservative hero and 
various scholars have also attempted to put Reagan in a specific category. H.W. Brands, for 
instance, sees Reagan as a pragmatist, whereas David Harvey sees Reagan as a neoliberal. But 
which of these visions of Reagan holds true in the case of the air traffic control strikers? The 
                                                          
1 Allen Pusey, ‘‘Reagan Fires Air Traffic Controllers,’’ ABA Journal 101, no. 8 (2015): 72. 
2 James C. Humes, The Reagan Persuasion: Charm, Inspire, and Deliver a Winning Message (Naperville: 
Sourcebooks, 2010), 1. 
3 H.W. Brands, Reagan: The Life (New York: Anchor Books, 2015), 288. 
4 Winston Groom, Ronald Reagan: Our 40th President (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2012), 144. 
5 Humes, 1. 
6 Frank Newport, ‘‘Americans Say Reagan is the Greatest U.S. President,’’ Gallup, February 18, 2011, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/146183/americans-say-reagan-greatest-president.aspx. 
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main question of this thesis will therefore be: what does Reagan’s handling of the air traffic 
controllers strike say about him as president?  
In order to answer this question, three schools of thought on the Reagan presidency will 
be evaluated in light of this specific case. The first of these is embodied by the Republicans. 
Republicans today like to remember Reagan as a far-right conservative and very successful 
president. According to Rory Carroll, correspondent for The Guardian, ‘‘for the GOP, Reagan is 
not just a name but an adjective connoting virtue and conservative ideological purity.’’7 His 
approval ratings have skyrocketed since he left office, with a 90 percent approval rate among 
Republicans and a 60 percent approval among Americans in general. In a single run-up debate 
for the 2016 Republican Convention, fifteen presidential candidates mentioned Reagan a total of 
45 times.8 Governor Scott Walker, for instance, praised Reagan’s tax cuts and the subsequent 
economic growth. Senator Rand Paul even says that if he were to become the next US president 
that he would try to be a Reagan conservative. To him, this means that he will try to accomplish 
peace through strength. Senator Marco Rubio mentioned Reagan’s love for his country as 
Reagan’s biggest influence on him personally. In general, all presidential candidates mentioned 
how Reagan was an optimist who wanted to change things and who loved America and saw 
potential in the American people.9 These, of course, are idealized visions of the former president.  
 Sean Wilentz, author of the book The Age of Reagan: A History 1974-2008, paints a 
more elaborate picture of what Reagan conservatism is actually about. In the book, Wilentz 
argues that Reagan shaped a conservative political moment in history which extends far beyond 
his eight years in office. Even Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were influenced heavily by 
Reagan, according to Wilentz. In 2009 he writes: ‘‘just as the period of American history from 
1933 to the late 1960s - between the rise of the New Deal and the fall of Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
Great Society – was chiefly one of liberal reform, so the past thirty-five years have been an era 
of conservatism.’’10 He further explains that Reagan’s ‘‘committed ideological conservative’’ 
                                                          
7 Rory Carroll, ‘‘The Myth of Ronald Reagan: Pragmatic Moderate or Radical Conservative?,’’ The Guardian, 
September 19, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/19/political-myth-ronald-reagan-republican-
moderate-conservative. 
8 Ibid. 
9 ‘‘CNN Reagan Library Debate: Later Debate Full Transcript,’’ CNN, September 16, 2015,  
http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2015/09/16/cnn-reagan-library-debate-later-debate-full-transcript/. 
10 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History 1974-2008 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 1. 
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policies entail ‘‘supply-side economics and confronting the Soviet Union and its proxies around 
the globe.’’11 Furthermore, social conservatives, anti-tax conservatives, and a wish for small 
government shape his policies.12 Despite the fact that Wilentz’s book is somewhat selective and 
hasty to jump to conclusions, Wilentz’s description of what it means to be a Reagan conservative 
is very useful for the purposes of this research.  
 A second school of thought on the Reagan presidency sees Reagan as a pragmatist. 
According to Jonathan Keller, a pragmatist is someone who can put his or her stated principles 
aside in order to accommodate circumstances, deal with strong political opposition, or rising 
costs.13 Keller set up a framework for researching pragmatism, as he noticed that pragmatism 
studies usually lack clear guidelines. He differentiates between three kinds of pragmatism, 
namely: pragmatism within limits, disinterested pragmatism, and creative reinterpretation 
pragmatism. Pragmatism within limits is defined as pragmatism that arises when decisions are 
particularly salient. The leader will then navigate between several options until one is found that 
is in line with the existing goals of the administration, although sometimes these goals change 
due to new information. Disinterested pragmatism is pragmatism that occurs after political 
pressure or openness to information. This pragmatism occurs only when the original/ internal 
considerations do not prove worthy enough to change political context. Finally, creative 
reinterpretation pragmatism also occurs after (very strong) political pressure. In this case, the 
president will betray his or her own ideology or political goals in order to solve a particular 
problem. The big difference between disinterested pragmatism and creative reinterpretation 
pragmatism is that in the latter, the president will reshape his or her political ideology in order to 
fit the new policy into his or her larger goals. In the former he does not.14    
 H.W. Brands also sees Reagan as a pragmatist. In his bibliography Reagan: The Life he 
shows that much legislation from that time resulted from negotiations with Congressional 
Democrats. During the social security reform negotiations Reagan noted in his diary that he 
would ‘‘reluctantly give in.’’15 During negotiations about taxes Reagan also gave in, even though 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 5. 
12 Ibid., 451. 
13 Jonathan W. Keller, ‘‘Explaining Rigidity and Pragmatism in Political Leaders: A General Theory and a 
Plausibility Test from the Reagan Presidency,’’ Political Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 476-477. 
14 Keller, 477-488. 
15 Brands, 305. 
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he very strongly believed that he should not. Reagan observed: ‘‘A compromise is never to 
anyone’s liking. […] It’s just the best you can get and contains enough of what you want to 
justify what you give up.’’16 Brands even characterizes Reagan’s policy towards communism as 
pragmatic, because Reagan often said one thing and did something else.17 Brands notes: ‘‘he 
wanted to make a mark, not merely to make a statement. He understood that the purpose of 
politics is to govern, not to preserve ideological purity. […] If he got four-fifths of his ask in a 
negotiation, he took it and ran.’’18 Brands does not use a framework in order to prove his point. 
However, his argument that Reagan is a pragmatist is still taken very seriously. 
 Finally, still others see Reagan more as a Neoliberal president. According to David 
Harvey, author of the book A Brief History of Neoliberalism, neoliberalism is ‘‘in the first 
instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.’’19 The 
role of the state must be kept as small as possible, providing only, if necessary, for a framework 
in which markets can exist. In his book, Harvey argues that neoliberalism flourished in the mid-
1970s, not only in the United States, but also in other parts of the world. He links the dominance 
of neoliberalism in the world to the election of Ronald Reagan. Margaret Thatcher, who was 
elected one year before Reagan, marks the beginning of the new social and economic movement, 
but with the election of Reagan, this movement really started to spread around the world. As 
Harvey argues: Ronald Reagan […] set the US on course to revitalize its economy by supporting 
Volcker’s [President of the Federal Reserve System or the Fed] moves at the Fed and adding his 
own particular blend of policies to curb the power of labour, deregulate industry, agriculture, and 
resource extraction, and liberate the powers of finance both internally and on the world stage.’’20 
Harvey is not the only one who thinks that Reagan played a pivotal role in the rise of 
neoliberalism. Centeno and Cohen support this view. According to them the ‘‘apparent economic 
success during the 1980s solidified the view that free market economics provided a sound basis 
                                                          
16 Ibid., 349.  
17 Ibid., 410-411.  
18 Ibid., 736. 
19 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2. 
20 Ibid., 1. 
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for policy, and many countries followed suit.’’21 A policy that nurtured this success was the 
deregulation of (mainly) the financial sector. Deregulation combined with inflation helped to 
nurture financial innovation.22  
 Harvey also believes that neoliberalism only benefits a lucky few, and is disadvantageous 
for the many. This has resulted in a strengthening of class inequality.23 He has even described 
this phenomenon as ‘accumulation by dispossession.’24 Inequality is a serious problem of 
neoliberalism, agree Jacobs and Meyers. They argue that Reagan’s neoliberal policy of 
weakening union strength, resulted in income inequality. Reagan’s tax policies also mainly 
benefitted prosperous Republicans. Combined with weaker unions, labor would be cheaper and 
with lower taxes the main financial burden would indirectly fall on less prosperous citizens.25  
 All these different schools of thought focus on different aspects of the Reagan 
presidency. In the following, it will be examined which school of thought proves most able to 
explain Reagan’s handling of the air traffic controllers strike. Obviously, the choice of case study 
will heavily influence which school of thought will prove most capable of explaining Reagan’s 
response. Therefore, this thesis will not attempt to find the best school of thought for the entire 
Reagan presidency. It will merely state which school best explains this particular case. This will 
nevertheless be useful, because the case signals a very important moment in the Reagan 
presidency. Furthermore, it will be shown that the different schools show overlap, and that it is 
not very easy to select only one of these schools. Even if it is to explain only a small part of the 
Reagan presidency.  
First of all, the case itself and the relative importance of the case will be explained. Then, 
the schools of thought will be evaluated in consideration of the air traffic controllers. Firstly, the 
school that thinks of Reagan as a conservative will be discussed. Then, the idea of Reagan as a 
pragmatist will be analyzed. Finally, the neoliberal school of thought will be discussed. Then the 
findings will be discussed in the subsequent conclusion.  
                                                          
21 Miguel A. Centeno and Joseph N. Cohen, ‘‘The Arc of Neoliberalism,’’ The Annual Review of Sociology 38, no. 3 
(2012): 324. 
22 Ibid., 320.  
23 Harvey, 90-93. 
24 David Harvey, ‘‘The ‘New’ Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession,’’ Socialist Register 40 (2009).  
25 David Jacobs and Lindsey Myers, ‘‘Union Strength, Neoliberalism, and Inequality: Contingent Political Analyses 
of U.S. Income Differences since 1950,’’ American Sociological Review 79, no. 4 (2014): 753-755. 
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PATCO: what happened? 
The Professional Air Traffic Controller’s Organization, better known as PATCO, was 
established in 1968 and was the certified agent for a part of the federal government’s employees. 
It had the mandate to handle the negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement. In 1981 
it was time again for PATCO to negotiate a new deal, since the old agreement would expire on 
March 15, 1981. The agreement would have to be made with the Federal Aviation 
Administration, the FAA, and the Department of Transportation, the DOT. The bargaining for a 
new agreement started on February 9, 1981.26 The main bargaining agent for PATCO was Robert 
E. Poli.  
During the Carter administration, air traffic controllers had suffered due to air traffic 
deregulation. Workload and work-related stress had increased significantly. On top of that, they 
also lost early retirement and immunity programs. Finally, their real earnings had also decreased. 
PATCO had therefore already made plans to strike and the Carter administration had made a 
contingency plan to counter the effects of a potential strike.27 When Reagan became president on 
January 20, 1981, he knew that the negotiation would be tough, but he also knew that there was a 
contingency plan in case of a strike.  
At first, Reagan and the White House were not directly involved with the negotiations. 
This changed after May 22, when Poli announced a strike. The date was set for June 22, and the 
plan was approved with an overwhelming majority of PATCO members. As a consequence, 
Drew Lewis, the Secretary of Transportation, joined the negotiations. Under Lewis’s leadership, 
the government made some concessions. However, Poli was not satisfied and on June 17 he 
walked out of the negotiations. When the strike date neared, it turned out that only 75 percent of 
the union members was willing to strike. This fell 5 percent short of the 80 percent PATCO 
thought it needed to effectively shut down air traffic, and therefore the strike was called off.28 A 
new contract was negotiated, but on July 2nd, this was struck down by the PATCO board, 
signaling further unrest among the members. After the board struck down the agreement Poli 
made, a strike became pretty much inevitable. A new strike, which was announced on July 29th, 
                                                          
26 Evelyn S. Taylor, P.A.T.C.O. and Reagan: An American Tragedy (Bloomington: Author House, 2011), xiii-5. 
27 Joseph A. McCartin, ‘‘A Historian’s Perspective on the PATCO Strike, Its Legacy, and Lessons,’’ Employee 
Responsibilities and Rights Journal 18, no. 3 (2006): 241. 
28 Ibid., 260-268.  
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was set for August 3rd. This time, PATCO did have enough support from its members to follow 
through.29 
When the strike began, President Reagan, backed up by Secretary Lewis, and the 
Attorney General William French Smith, made a statement regarding the strike. After 
emphasizing that the union had cast away a contract that had already been signed by both sides, 
Reagan started speaking of what’s at stake:  
Let me make one thing plain. I respect the right of workers in the private sector to strike. 
Indeed, as president of my own union, I led the first strike ever called by that union. I 
guess I'm maybe the first one to ever hold this office who is a lifetime member of an AFL 
- CIO union. But we cannot compare labor-management relations in the private sector 
with government. Government cannot close down the assembly line. It has to provide 
without interruption the protective services which are government’s reason for being.30 
The big difference between the public and private sector that Reagan refers to, is that 
government employees are, by law, prohibited to strike. U.S. law specifically states that:  
An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States 
or the government of the District of Columbia if he […] participates in a strike, or asserts 
the right to strike, against the Government of the United States or the government of the 
District of Columbia; or is a member of an organization of employees of the Government 
of the United States or of individuals employed by the government of the District of 
Columbia that he knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United 
States or the government of the District of Columbia.31 
Since the air traffic controllers are government employees they are not allowed to strike. Reagan 
gave the strikers an ultimatum: return to work within 48 hours, or be fired. Approximately a 
quarter of all PATCO members took the warning seriously and went back to work. Together with 
supervisors and some military controllers, half of the scheduled flights could go out.32 Later, this 
                                                          
29 Ibid., 275-277. 
30 Ronald Reagan, ‘‘Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on the Air Traffic Controllers 
Strike August 3, 1981,’’ The Reagan Library, August 3, 1981, 
https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1981/80381a.htm.  
31 5 U.S. Code § 7311, ‘‘Loyalty and striking.’’ 
32 Brands, 311. 
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was increased to 75 percent.33 Immediately after the 48-hour deadline, government begin firing 
people. Over 11,000 air traffic controllers were fired. Many of them appealed this decision, but 
most of the appeals were overturned. In their stead came newly hired air traffickers who were 
pushed through training school as fast as possible. Many supervisors and some military 
personnel also helped to break the strike.34  
On October 22, 1981 the Federal Labor Relations Authority decided that PATCO would 
be decertified. This meant that PATCO lost its right to bargain with the government on behalf of 
the air traffickers. On June 11, 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
affirmed this decision.35 Some of the PARCO leaders were even hauled before court. This meant 
the definitive end of PATCO and many of its members who had stood by the union, and 
therewith gambled away their jobs. Ronald Reagan came out without any damage to his 
reputation or approval ratings. He has even been called ‘‘the nicest president ever to destroy a 
union.’’36 
 It is not extremely unusual for a president to intervene in a strike. Different presidents 
have intervened in strikes before, albeit never as decisively and destructively as Reagan. During 
the 1877 railroad strike, president Hayes had intervened in a strike by deploying federal troops to 
stop riots. Different governors and railroad companies had pressured Hayes into acting because 
over 100 people were killed in three weeks’ time. It is thus no wonder that Hayes decided to 
intervene, but it did stop the union’s attempt to combat salary cuts.37 President Theodore 
Roosevelt also personally intervened in a strike. In 1902 there was a coal strike which resulted in 
a shortage of coal in eastern cities. Roosevelt decided that he did not want to stand on the 
sidelines of this conflict. Therefore, he invited the unions and the employers to the White House 
to negotiate a compromise. When the employers refused to compromise Roosevelt gave them a 
commission, which resulted in better wages for the coal miners.38 Finally, Truman also 
                                                          
33 Pusey, 72. 
34 Reagan, ‘‘Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on the Air Traffic Controllers Strike 
August 3, 1981.’’ 
35 Taylor, 22-31.  
36 Robert Lekachman, Greed is not Enough (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 3. 
37 Jessica Piper, ‘‘The Great Railroad Strike of 1877: A Catalyst for the American Labor Movement,’’ The History 
Teacher 47, no. 1 (2013): 95. 
38 Robert H. Wiebe, ‘‘The Anthracite Strike of 1902: A Record of Confusion,’’ The Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review 48, no. 2 (1961): 229-230. 
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intervened in a 1946 steel strike. After a deadlock in negotiations, Truman offered the steel 
industry a $5 per ton increase in carbon steel prices, from which they could pay a salary increase. 
During the Second World War wages were regulated, but once this was let go, the industry 
sought a price relief. This could only be done by lowering salaries, or increasing prices. 
Consequently, the Truman administration had to terminate its postwar stabilization policy, and 
eventually this led to the end of price and wage controls.39 These examples show that it is not 
very unusual for presidents to intervene in strikes when the stakes are high. In all these examples, 
the employees were not government employees, but nevertheless the government intervened; 
either to ensure peace, or to ensure a quicker solution of the issue at stake. The president thus has 
a significant ability to help or hurt unions.  
 
Relevance of the strike 
The PATCO strike of 1981 has had many consequences for US labor relations. According to 
Joseph McCartin it was ‘‘the most significant single event in accelerating the decline of 
organized labor in the United States in the late 20th century.’’40 Willis Nordmund affirms this by 
stating: ‘‘the single event that sent the strongest signals about unions and the role of labor in the 
economy – to the American people, generally, and the American labor movement, specifically – 
was the breaking of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization union by the Reagan 
administration in 1981.’’41 The PATCO strike thus had much influence on the labor movement 
in the United States. Most notably, unions faced a serious decline in members. For instance, 
between 1980 and 1984, the American Federation of Government Employees, the largest federal 
union, lost 2.7 million of its members.42 Other statistics show that in the 25 years following the 
strike, union density has been cut in half. A decrease is also true for non-governmental sectors. 
Furthermore, although the failure of the strike did not result in fewer strikes, it has made the 
option of replacing strikers by other workers a more acceptable solution.43 Before the PATCO 
strike this was almost unthinkable, but afterwards management changed and the idea of ‘take-
                                                          
39 Frederick H. Harbison and Robert C. Spencer, ‘‘The Politics of Collective Bargaining: The Postwar Record in 
Steel,’’ The American Political Science Review 48, no. 3 (1954): 706-708. 
40 McCartin, ‘‘A Historian’s Perspective on the PATCO Strike, Its Legacy, and Lessons,’’ 215. 
41 Willis J. Nordlund, Silent Skies: The Air Traffic Controllers’ Strike (Chicago: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 13.  
42 Taylor, 41. 
43 McCartin, ‘‘A Historian’s Perspective on the PATCO Strike, Its Legacy, and Lessons,’’ 217-219. 
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the-job-or-leave-the-job’ and ‘fire-at-will policies’ gained a stronger foothold.44 It is also 
possible that the political influence of the labor movement diminished after the PATCO strike, 
since the strikers did not have much public support.45 Even though these developments cannot 
solely be explained by the PATCO strike - other factors may have been influential as well - the 
PATCO strike did contribute significantly to these changes. 
 Moreover, the strike has been important because it affected so many people. Strikers 
were active in almost every state and territory of the United States. The total costs of the strike 
were also enormous. When lost profits of cancelled flight are included in an estimation, it is 
possible that the strike cost a total of more than one billion dollars.46 Joseph McCartin even 
wrote in the opinion pages of The New York Times that Reagan:  
showed federal workers and Soviet leaders alike how tough he could be. Although there 
were 39 illegal work stoppages against the federal government between 1962 and 1981, 
no significant federal job actions followed Reagan’s firing of the PATCO strikers. His 
forceful handling of the walkout, meanwhile, impressed the Soviets, strengthening his 
hand in the talks he later pursued with Mikhail S. Gorbachev.47 
McCartin does not give any proof of his assertion that the firing impressed the Soviet Union and 
Gorbachev. One could be inclined to put some question marks next to this claim. Nevertheless, 
this statement does show that many, in general, were impressed by Reagan’s though stand.  
 
Reagan as a conservative 
Many people see Ronald Reagan as a conservative hero. Garland Tucker, for instance, named 
Reagan one of fourteen ‘conservative hero’s’ who shaped America. He states that Reagan’s 
‘‘legacy to conservatism deserves notice […]. While being the object of the intellectual 
establishment’s scorn, [Reagan] managed to make conservative philosophy, which had 
                                                          
44 Taylor, 41-42. 
45 McCartin, ‘‘A Historian’s Perspective on the PATCO Strike, Its Legacy, and Lessons,’’ 217-219. 
46 Ibid., 216. 
47 Joseph A. McCartin, ‘‘The Strike That Busted Unions,’’ The New York Times, August 2, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/opinion/reagan-vs-patco-the-strike-that-busted-unions.html?_r=0. 
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supposedly been buried in the Johnson landslide of 1964, part of American mainstream.’’48 
Reagan was thus driven by a conservative discourse. Conservatives generally want to maintain 
the status-quo. Roger Scuton in his book The Meaning of Conservatism defines conservatism in 
the following way: ‘‘Conservatism has sought expression through the activity (or, just as often, 
through the strategic inactivity) of a particular party, a party dedicated to maintaining the 
structure and institutions of a society threatened by mercantile enthusiasm and social unrest.’’49 
This is a rather general description of conservatism. More specific to the Reagan presidency, 
conservatism can be seen in terms of supply-side economics, anti-tax conservatives, a wish for 
small government, confronting the Soviet Union and its proxies around the globe, and social 
conservatives, according to Wilentz.50 These aspects will be discussed in the following with 
regard to the air traffic controller’s strike.  
 First of all, supply side economics can be seen as part of Reagan conservatism. Supply 
side economic theory is a theory that believes in the power of private and personal incentives. 
People are influenced by incentives and will change their behavior according to the incentives. 
The government can change these incentives and therewith control the way in which people 
behave. Government can give people positive or negative incentives through fiscal, monetary, or 
regulatory policy. An example of a positive incentive is subsidy, whereas taxes can be seen as a 
negative incentive.51 Reagan thought that supply side economics would be the savior of the 
United States economy. By lowering tax rates, people would get more incentives to work, save, 
and invest, because they would get more revenue out of these activities. Rationality dictates that 
people work harder if the rewards are larger.52 In his term as president, Reagan significantly 
reduced tax rates even though he later had to revise his policy slightly, because expected 
successes held off. In August 1981 personal income tax was reduced by 25 percent. The bill also 
substantially reduced business taxation. In 1982, the Reagan administration had to increase tax 
revenue due to the unexpected recession and a large budget deficit. Nevertheless, in 1982 taxes 
                                                          
48 Garland S. Tucker III, Conservative Heroes: Fourteen Leaders Who Shaped America, from Jefferson to Reagan 
(Wilmington: ISI Books, 2015), 199.  
49 Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), 15. 
50 Wilentz, 5, 451.  
51 Victor A. Canto et al., Foundations of Supply-Side Economics: Theory and Evidence (New York: Academic 
Press, 1983), xv-xvi. 
52 Lekachman, 12-13. 
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were still much lower than before the 1981 tax cut.53 Reagan can thus be seen as an anti-tax 
conservative.  
 Besides tax cuts, Reagan also made huge changes to the budget. He allocated much more 
money towards the military. In exchange for this, Reagan made huge budget cuts in hundreds of 
domestic programs. This ensured a balance so that the real government spending was not that 
different from Carter’s spending.54 Reagan’s tax cut had to be joined by a budget cut in order to 
pay for the nation’s spending. The income increases that PATCO demanded do not fit in this 
picture. PATCO initially asked for a 10,000-dollar increase in year salary, combined with shorter 
work weeks, and a higher pension.55 The fact that Reagan did not give in to these demands 
shows that he looked at the long-term consequences, instead of the short term consequences. In 
the short run, the strike would cost a lot of money, but it would have cost the government even 
more if it had given in to the demands, since year salaries come back every year. In that sense, 
we can say that Reagan’s handling of the strike, by not giving in to long term costs, was in line 
with his idea of supply side economics.   
 On the other hand, Reagan did offer PATCO some salary increases. Of course, it was 
nowhere near the 10,000 dollar that Poli had asked for, but that was Poli’s opening offer, surely 
leaving some room open for negation. When Lewis joined the negotiation, he offered PATCO a 
five percent raise, as well as a ten percent nighttime raise.56 Reagan was thus not totally 
unwilling to spend more money on the air traffic controllers. Other unions at that time could not 
count on such salary increases and Reagan did not have to offer PATCO the salary increase. In 
fact, many in his administration were against the offer, since it could lead to more strikes or 
stronger negotiations with other unions. According to an administration official ‘‘some worried 
that the proposal would conflict with the administration’s efforts to slow government spending 
and reduce inflation and create a precedent that would encourage other federal unions to adopt 
militant PATCO tactics.’’57 Furthermore, never before had the government made such a huge 
                                                          
53 James  M. Buchanan et al., Reaganomics and After (London: IEA Readings, 1989), 38-39.  
54 William A. Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider’s Account of the Policies and the People (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 11.  
55 Ibid., 192. 
56 McCartin, Collision Course, 260-261. 
57 Ibid., 262. 
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offer with a federal employees’ union.58 The offer was not necessary in the sense that once the 
air traffic controllers were fired, the FAA quickly received 120,000 new applications. These 
were all from people willing to work for the existing salary.59 It is thus hard to say why Reagan 
initially approved such an offer. It could be that he genuinely wanted to avoid a strike, scared off 
by the huge short term costs this would bring. It is also possible that he wanted to pay off his 
campaign promise to PATCO. Nevertheless, this offer shows some willingness to spend extra 
money on the air traffic controllers. Something that is not in line with Reagan’s policy of 
cutbacks.  
 Another aspect of Reagan conservatism is the wish for a small government. Reagan could 
have used the strike to privatize the air traffic controllers section. Niskanen argues that the 
Reagan administration ‘‘passed up the opportunity to ‘privatize’ parts of the air traffic control 
system – either by turning over airport control centers to local airport authorities or by 
contracting for air traffic control services.’’60 Reagan thus passed up an opportunity to make the 
government smaller. At the same time, it also makes sense that Reagan did not do this. The air 
traffic controllers’ strike did not negatively influence his approval ratings, but if he would have 
changed the entire system afterwards, people might have accused Reagan of provoking a strike 
in order to advance his own agenda. It is thus understandable that Reagan did not change the 
system.  
Yet another aspect of Reagan conservatism is being though on the Soviet Union. 
According to some commentators, the way in which Reagan broke the strike impressed the 
Soviet Union, and therewith helped Reagan in his foreign policy. As shown earlier, McCartin 
believes that Reagan’s ‘forceful handling’ impressed Soviet leaders and helped Reagan in the 
negotiations with the Soviet Union.61 Garland Tucker also agrees with this reasoning as he says 
that ‘‘the PATCO episode sent a powerful message that this administration meant what it said 
and would not back away from its principled positions – a message delivered to political allies 
and opponents not only at home but abroad as well.’’62 Peggy Noonan, who was a speechwriter 
for Ronald Reagan, remembers George Shultz, Reagan’s secretary of state, saying that the 
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PATCO strike was the single most important foreign policy decision Reagan had ever made.63 
And Soviet expert Richard Pipes said that the image of the leader of the air traffic controllers’ 
union being taken to jail, was the kind of image a totalitarian regime understood.64 Although 
none of these sources give any proof for their statements, these statements at least show that 
there was a general consensus that the way in which Reagan handled the PATCO strike sent a 
strong signal to the Soviet Union. Whether this thought had crossed Reagan’s mind before 
making the decision is unknown. Therefore, it is also hard to say whether Reagan deliberately 
used the strike to send a signal towards the Soviet Union.  
Social conservatives also play a role in Reagan conservatism. According to the 
Dictionary of American Government and Politics social conservatives are traditional family 
values that should be actively promoted by the government. These values can differ among 
different people, but traditionally people adhering to these conservatives are pro-life, believe in 
restrictions in gay marriage, and see the traditional family as the core of society.65 Jeff Spross 
argues that unions are ‘a textbook example’ of a network which brings employees together ‘‘in a 
shared communal purpose.’’66 Unions are part of the civil society of families, churches, 
voluntary groups, and community groups. This civil society is a group that conservatives care a 
lot about.67 Reagan’s handling of the PATCO strike destroyed the union as it lost its negotiation 
privileges after the strike. Unions in general also became much less powerful after the firing of 
the air traffic controllers. Instead of helping the civil society, Reagan’s action ensured the 
downfall of a part of it. Furthermore, the Republican party became far more anti-union after the 
PATCO strike than it had been before the strike.68 Right now ‘‘it’s hard to think of any group 
that Republicans oppose more starkly than organized labor.’’69 Reagan’s handling of the strike is 
thus not in line with social conservatives.  
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All in all, the way in which Reagan responded to the strike is not a clear example of 
conservatism. In some instances, it is hard to make a clear conclusion of whether his handling 
was conservative or not. In none of the examined areas, is this case a clear example of Reagan 
conservatism.  
 
Reagan as a pragmatist 
At a first glance, Reagan’s conduct surrounding the air traffic controllers strike does not seem to 
be pragmatic. In fact, H.W. Brands does not use this case as an example of Reagan’s 
pragmatism. This is despite the fact that he dedicates a chapter of Reagan’s biography to the 
strike. It is true that Reagan’s 48-hour ultimatum speech does not signal a willingness to 
compromise. However, if we delve deeper into the negotiations it becomes apparent that the 
Reagan administration was indeed willing to make some serious concessions.  
 On February 9, 1981, PATCO started the negotiations for a new collective bargaining 
agreement, as the former agreement would soon expire.70 The White House knew it would be a 
tough bargaining process, as the Carter administration had had many negative consequences for 
air traffic controllers. For instance, controllers had lost their early retirement program. The Carter 
administration had even made a contingency plan in the event of a strike.71 Despite signs that the 
negotiation could go wrong, the White House did not involve itself in the negotiations initially. 
This changed when Poli announced his plan to strike at the PATCO’s national convention on 
May 22, 1981. This plan was approved by a huge majority, and therewith gave Poli a very strong 
weapon. Consequently, some White House top officials started to get involved. Craig Fuller, 
Secretary of the Cabinet, started asking for daily updates and most importantly, Drew Lewis, 
Secretary of Transportation, joined the negotiations table.72 Even though Reagan did not publicly 
support Lewis, privately both Reagan and his staff supported Lewis during these negotiations.73 
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 With Drew Lewis’s active involvement in the negotiations, more and more concessions 
were made on the side of the government. After negotiating with some of Reagan’s top advisors, 
Lewis got the President’s approval for some serious concessions. Amongst others, Lewis offered 
PATCO a five percent salary raise, a ten percent nighttime raise, and a paid lunch break.74 This 
kind of raise in government jobs was unprecedented and especially generous given the fact that 
the economy at this time was not at its best. The administrations offer was also completely 
against its own policies of reducing government spending and inflation. From 1973 onwards, the 
United States had been plagued by stagflation, a combination of high inflation, low economic 
growth, and high unemployment. Many people therefore feared the end of American economic 
supremacy. Reagan had been elected by promising to turn the economy around. He proposed to 
do this by cutting taxes, shrinking government spending (with the exception of military 
spending), encouraging private investment, and keeping the military strong.75 Even in these 
circumstances, Reagan showed his willingness to negotiate and compromise. This could be seen 
as a form of disinterested pragmatism. Reagan did not change his policy of reduced government 
spending. However, the threat of a strike, with the huge costs that it comes with, forced Reagan 
to give the negotiators some leeway.  
 Despite the new concessions on the side of the government, Poli did not find the new 
terms agreeable. PATCO wanted much more and believed they could get it. Poli was 
strengthened in his beliefs by a campaign promise made by Reagan in 1980. In exchange for a 
PATCO endorsement Reagan, then a candidate for the presidency, wrote a letter in which he 
recognized some of the air traffic controllers’ grievances:  
You can rest assured that if I am elected President, I will take whatever steps are 
necessary to provide our air traffic controllers with the most modern equipment available 
and to adjust staff levels and work days so that they are commensurate with achieving a 
maximum degree of public safety. […] I pledge to you that my administration will work 
very closely with you to bring about a spirit of cooperation between the President and the 
air traffic controllers.76 
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Poli, most likely, saw this as a sign of goodwill. He believed that Reagan would help him and 
therefore PATCO endorsed Reagan’s bid for presidency. Reagan, however, did not make very 
clear and precise promises. Before the PATCO endorsement, Poli had asked for some very 
specific promises. He did not get these promises and had to push hard to get anything in writing 
at all. When he finally did receive a letter, he most likely interpreted it to mean more that it did to 
Reagan. McCartin argues that both men saw what they wanted to see in the cooperation:   
Because each side saw the other as an instrumentality that could help it attain something 
it desperately desired - for the Reagan campaign it was a symbolically important labor 
ally and for PATCO it was a president who could help it make a breakthrough at the 
bargaining table - each side had an interest in believing what it wanted to believe about 
the nature of their bargain.77 
PATCO was among the few labor organizations that supported Reagan. Most labor leaders were 
not happy with Reagan’s candidacy. Reagan was opposed to the minimum wage, and wished to 
reduce the scope of health and safety laws.78 It was thus rather peculiar that Poli did believe that 
the Reagan administration would be beneficial to the air traffic controllers union. The fact that 
Reagan offered the union as much as it did was already more than what most could expect. If the 
offer was made because of the endorsement, then it could be seen as a pragmatic offer. 
Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing why Reagan offered the salary increase. It is possible 
that he simply wanted to avoid a strike, or that he thought the increase was fair given the 
stressfulness of the job. According to Linda Gosden, an aide to Drew Lewis, PATCO did not 
take the offer ‘‘because they were a cliquish, macho group of three at the head of PATCO.’’79 
Also, ‘‘Poli and his colleagues were not good in negotiation.’’80  
PATCO thus overplayed its hands and was not able to control its members anymore. 
When Poli finally went to his members to get a deal approved, they rejected it, because they 
were promised more. That made the strike almost unavoidable. Reagan, represented by Lewis, 
could not offer more, and there was no reason to offer more given the fact that the strike was 
illegal and fostered little public support. PATCO, by demanding too much, gave Reagan no other 
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choice than to take a tough stance. As Morgan states: ‘‘the President had been elected – as he 
saw it – on an anti-government, anti-taxation, anti-inflation platform and was ready to make an 
example of PATCO if he had to.’’81 Before it came to this, the Reagan administration had tried 
very hard to prevent a strike. It was willing to offer PATCO considerable advantages, at a time 
when other labor movements were not given anything at all. It can thus be said that Reagan was 
pragmatic at first, but was later pushed to go back to his initial principles, because PATCO 
challenged the government to get more than what could be considered reasonable at the time. 
When the government got the upper hand in the negotiations on June 22, right after PATCO 
members had rejected the idea of a strike, Lewis and Reagan kept their offer on the table, 
showing considerable goodwill on their part. Some government officials wanted to take off some 
of the items that they had offered earlier, knowing that PATCO had lost its most efficient 
weapon. But even at this time, Lewis specifically ordered them not to do this. The Reagan 
administration was thus very considerate and willing to work with PATCO to come to an 
agreement. Only once PATCO members finally did agree to a strike, was Reagan relentless in 
his response.  
 
Reagan as a neoliberal 
A third school of thought remembers Ronald Reagan as a neoliberal. Neoliberalism can be 
divided up into five important aspects. These are: entrepreneurial freedom, free markets, a small 
role of the state, the rule of law, and inequality. These are highlighted as important by Harvey in 
his book A Brief History of Neoliberalism.82 Previously, it has been argued that Reagan passed 
up an opportunity to make the government smaller. He could have used the strike to privatize 
(parts of) the air traffic controllers. Instead, he chose not to do this. Since this aspect has already 
been discussed, it will be skipped in the following section. The remaining four will be discussed 
in light of the 1981 strike.  
 In neoliberalism there is an emphasis on entrepreneurial freedoms. This means that the 
emphasis is on the employer, not the employee. Entrepreneurial freedoms are enlarged when 
there are no unions, since unions constrict the freedom of the employer. According to Harvey, 
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Reagan’s response to the PATCO strike was ‘‘an all-out assault on the powers of organized 
labour. But PATCO was more than an ordinary union: it was a white-collar union which had the 
character of a skilled professional association. It was, therefore, an icon of middle-class rather 
than working-class unionism.’’83 With the ‘attack’ on PATCO, not just PATCO but also other 
unions were hurt. Furthermore, not just working-class unions were hurt, but middle-class unions 
were also wounded. The Federal minimum wage, for instance, dropped with 30 percent between 
1980 and 1990. This while the minimum wage in 1980 was on par with the poverty level.84 This 
is obviously beneficial for employers. Furthermore, as Dean Baker argues:  
Reagan’s decision to fire the air traffic controllers changed the basic norms surrounding 
labor-management relations. Within a year, there were several major strikes in the private 
sector in which employers opted to hire replacement workers rather than reach an 
agreement with striking workers. As the hiring of replacement workers became a 
standard practice, unions came to realize that going on strike could end up costing 
workers their jobs. This made the labor strike a far less effective weapon for unions in a 
wide range of industries.85 
This means that unions lost significant negotiation power, and therewith it is easier for 
entrepreneurs to impose their wishes unto the employees. Even more examples of the resulted 
loss of power for unions, like for instance a loss in memberships, were given earlier.  
In a free market it is important that supply and demand are in balance. The market is 
always looking for its equilibrium. On the labor market, there are also supply and demand 
curves. Supply is then the amount of people willing to work for an X amount of money, whereas 
demand is the amount of people an employer is willing to hire for that amount of money. The air 
traffic controllers that Reagan fired wanted an increase in salary. The strike shows that they were 
not willing to work for their previous salary anymore. Others, however, were willing to work for 
that salary. After the 11,000 controllers were fired, the FAA wanted to hire new controllers. 
They soon received more than 120,000 applications. According to Niskanen ‘‘the existing salary 
was apparently adequate to attract more than a sufficient supply of qualified applicants.’’86 Free 
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market economists would even say that the existing salary is too high, since it attracts more 
people than necessary. The salary of the controllers was thus definitely not too low, according to 
the principle of free markets. The air traffic controllers market however, is not part of the free 
market. The government has a monopoly on the entire system. In that sense, the free market does 
not apply to the controller’s case. If Reagan had opened up the market to others, it would have 
also made the government smaller. The same argument made earlier about the possibility of 
shrinking the size of government thus applies here.  
The third aspect of neoliberalism that will be discussed here is the rule of law. This 
means that the law should decide whether something is legal, or illegal, not an individual or a 
government official. In this case it is clear that government employees are not allowed to strike 
according to the law. Furthermore, the controllers swore an affidavit saying: ‘‘I am not 
participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, 
and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any 
agency thereof.’’87 The strike was thus clearly illegal. Reagan has been accused of having 
different motives for firing the workers. One of these motives could be the breaking of unions in 
general. According to Niskanen, however, ‘‘Reagan discharged the striking controllers solely 
because their action was an illegal strike.’’88 There are also many sources that conform this view. 
First of all, Reagan, in his autobiography An American Life, writes that ‘‘by instinct and 
experience, I supported unions and the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively.’’89 
Reagan was even president of the Screen Actors Guild when he was younger and had led the first 
strike of this union. This supports the view that he is not against unions per se. He continues to 
say that ‘‘no president could tolerate an illegal strike.’’90 In the diary he kept while in office he 
states on June 21 that he ‘‘would not countenance an illegal strike nor would [he] permit 
negotiations while such a strike was in process.’’91 In the speech he gave on August 3rd, he 
quotes an air traffic controller who had said: ‘‘How can I ask my kids to obey the law if I 
don’t?’’92 The emphasis in all these communications is on the illegality of the strike. Of course, 
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one must keep in mind that these are official communications. Even his diary must have been 
written, knowing that one day it would be publicized. This does not mean though, that the 
emphasis on illegality is artificial. On December 9th, 1981, he writes that he made the decision to 
allow fired air traffic controllers to obtain a different government job. Normally, fired 
government employees have to wait three years before applying for a new government job.93 
Reagan is thus accommodating the workers, something he probably would not have done if he 
had wanted to send a strong message to other unions as well.  
 Finally, inequality is also an important aspect of neoliberalism. Jacobs and Meyer prove 
that there is a link between the reduction of union strength under the Reagan administration and 
the increase in income equality in the United States after 1981. Later neoliberal administrations 
also helped this acceleration of income inequality.94 On top of that, Harvey shows that in the 
United States there is a dominant culture in which people believe that each individual is 
responsible for his or her own successes and failures. Rather than blaming a system that favors 
the more fortunate, people believe that everybody can make his or her own success.95 This can 
also be seen in de media reports of the strike and Reagan’s approval ratings. PATCO could count 
on very little public support. On August 5th, the day on which the firings began, CBS news 
reported: ‘‘they talk about pressure, they talk about all the rigors of the job, and people say, I got 
a rough job, I got pressure; why are they better than me?’’96 Many people were willing to take 
one year or more of reduced air traffic, because they thought the union’s demands were too high. 
In general, strikes in the United States make people feel frustrated and angry. Consequently, 
when the controllers were fired, very few tears were shed over it. The public thought that the 
controllers should have simply continued to work hard for their money. Similarly, Reagan’s 
approval ratings after the firings were still high, with 48 percent of respondents naming the firing 
as the number-one aspect of why they liked Reagan.97 Inequality was thus much bigger after the 
firings, but people did not seem to notice or mind.  
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 All in all, three out of five aspects of neoliberalism apply here. The strike gave 
entrepreneurs more freedom, the rule of law was held up, and inequality rose up after the strike. 
There is however no free market and the size of government has not been reduced either.  
 
Conclusion 
In this study the question has been asked: what does Reagan’s handling of the air traffic 
controllers strike say about him as president. To answer this question, three different schools of 
thought have been evaluated in light of this case. These schools have different interpretations 
about who Reagan is. One sees Reagan as a conservative, the second one sees Reagan as a 
pragmatist, and the last one sees Reagan as a neoliberal president. In order to evaluate the case, a 
framework has been made for each school on the basis of one important scholar within that 
school.  
 First, the conservative school was discussed. Sean Wilentz, a scholar in this school, 
provided several aspects that are important to this school. Supply side economics and tax cuts 
are, for instance, seen as important conservative values of the Reagan presidency. Tax cuts go 
hand in hand with budget cuts in supply side economics. Even though Reagan ultimately did not 
spend less than his predecessor, he did cut back domestic government spending drastically, in 
order to pay for his military build-up. Reagan’s willingness to (initially) increase the controllers’ 
salary, is not in line with domestic cut backs. Furthermore, Reagan passed up the opportunity to 
reduce the size of government, a second goal for conservatives. Social conservative values have 
also not been achieved, since unions are traditionally part of the conservative civil society. 
Reagan did impress the Soviet Union by showing his willingness to act on his word. Whether 
this was deliberate or not, and in how far it really did impress the Soviet Union, is not known. 
All in all, it can be said that this case does not show the conservative side of Reagan. 
 Secondly, Reagan is sometimes seen as a pragmatist, for instance by H.W. Brands. The 
air traffic controllers’ negotiations fits well within this school of thought. Despite the strong 
ultimatum that Reagan gave the controllers, Reagan did show his willingness to make some 
serious concessions. Even in times of cutbacks, Reagan was willing to offer PATCO some 
serious salary increases. These increases were unprecedented, and in a time where other unions 
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had to deal with reductions. A higher offer was thus simply not realistic. PATCO, on the other 
hand, was not willing to compromise, and overplayed its hand. This eventually forced Reagan to 
be though on PATCO, but nevertheless this case does show that Reagan is willing to 
compromise and be pragmatic if he has to.  
 Finally, a third school of thought was discussed. This school, embodied by amongst 
others, David Harvey, believes that Reagan is a neoliberal president. For this school too, several 
aspects highlighted by Harvey were taken to provide for a framework. The first of these is 
entrepreneurial freedom. Due to Reagan’s handling of the strike, unions lost significant power, 
which in turn enlarged entrepreneurial freedom. Secondly, the rule of law was held up, since the 
strike was clearly illegal. Had Reagan tolerated the strike, the rule of law would have been 
ignored. Thirdly, inequality rose after the strike. This is also due to the fact that unions in general 
lost much power after the 1981 strike. The final two aspects, the free market and a reduction of 
the size of government do not apply to this case. The government had a monopoly on air traffic 
control and Reagan did not change this after the strike. Some aspects of this school thus apply to 
the case, whereas others do not. 
 Out of the three schools of thought here discussed, the school that views Reagan as a 
pragmatist applies best here. However, some aspects of the school that views Reagan as a 
neoliberal also apply. The conservative school and the neoliberal school show some overlap. For 
instance, both highlight the goal of reducing the size of government. Since there is no clear 
framework for these schools, it is hard to make a final analysis. Other authors might highlight 
other aspects of the school, which could result in different conclusions. By using a relatively 
small, yet important case, this study shows the limitations of using these kinds of schools in 
analyzing a presidency. Even with this small case it is hard to give a definite answer of which 
school applies best. Let alone if one of these school should attempt to explain the entire 
presidency. Therefore, one should always be wary of trying to put a label on a presidency.   
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